ࡱ> 685  bjbj̵ c(צצyyyyy$P$%%;;;yDyy;;DDDy;y;DDDyyD\FndD`<0DDDDyD ?:   Course Description for EC 0152 (The Economic Analysis of Institutions) Fall, 2011 Professor Kaivan Munshi Department of Economics Robinson Hall, 304A Tel. 863-9331 e-mail: munshi@brown.edu Office hours: Monday 3:30-5:00 TA: Bruno Gasperini e-mail: Bruno_Gasperini@brown.edu Office hours: Friday 10:30-12 This course deals with the economic analysis of institutions, with a focus on developing countries. The first section covers institutions in traditional agrarian societies and follows the textbook Development Economics, by Debraj Ray (Princeton University Press) for the most part. It is recommended, but not required, that you purchase the textbook. Topics covered in this section include consumption smoothing and the organization of land and credit markets. The second section covers selected research papers on community-based networks, institutional persistence, and political economy. Course requirements: Students are required to submit four problem sets over the course of the semester. These problem sets account for 10% of the course grade. The remainder of the grade will be determined by three tests, each accounting for 25% of the grade, and class participation (15%). The first test will be held on Tuesday, October 4, the second test on Tuesday, November 8, and the third test on Tuesday, December 6. There will be no class on October 20, November 1, and November 24 (Thanksgiving). Syllabus A. Introduction - game theory and regression analysis (2 lectures) Textbook - Appendix 1,2 B. Institutions in Traditional Agrarian Societies 1. Insurance (3 lectures) - Chapter 15 Paxson, Christina H., Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to Transitory Income in Thailand, American Economic Review, Vol.82, No.1, March 1992, p.15-33. Townsend, Robert M., Risk and Insurance in Village India, Econometrica, Vol.62, No.3, May 1994, p.539-591. 2. Land (1 lecture) - Chapter 12 Shaban, Radwan Ali, Testing Between Competing Models of Sharecropping, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.95, No.5, 1987, p.893-920. 3. Credit (1 lecture) - Chapter 14 C. Community-based Networks, Institutional Persistence, and Political Economy 1. Networks (4 lectures) Greif, Avner, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders Coalition, American Economic Review, Vol.83, No.3, June 1993, p.525-548. Munshi, Kaivan, Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U.S. Labor Market, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.118, No.2, 2003, p.549-597. Munshi, Kaivan, Strength in Numbers: Networks as a Solution to Occupational Traps, Review of Economic Studies, Vol.78, 2011, p.1069-1101. Bandiera, Oriana, Iwan Barankay and Imran Rasul, Social Preferences and the Response to Incentives: Evidence from Personnel Data, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 120, 2005, p.917-962. Bandiera, Oriana, Iwan Barankay and Imran Rasul, Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data, Econometrica, Vol. 77, 2009, p.1047-1094.. 2. Institutional Persistence (5 lectures) Galor, Oded and Joseph Zeira, Income Distribution and Macroeconomics, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 60, 1993, p.35-52. Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation, American Economic Review, Vol.91, No.5, 2001, p.1369-1401. Banerjee, Abhijit and Lakshmi Iyer, History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India, American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 4, 2005, p.1190-1213. Munshi, Kaivan and Mark Rosenzweig, Traditional Institutions Meet the Modern World: Caste, Gender and Schooling Choice in a Globalizing Economy, American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 4, 2006, p.1225-1252. Chay, Kenneth and Kaivan Munshi, Slaverys Legacy: Black Mobilization in the Postbellum South, Brown University typescript. 3. Political Economy (2 lectures) Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate, An Economic Model of Representative Democracy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.112, No.1, 1997, p.85-114. Duflo, Esther, Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India, Econometrica, Vol. 72, No. 5, 2004, p.1409-1443. Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan, Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance, University of California at Berkeley, typescript. Munshi, Kaivan and Mark Rosenzweig, Networks, Commitment, and Competence: Caste in Indian Local Politics Brown University typescript.     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